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Abstract
We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider
(CP)’s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services (QoS) in content delivery
to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP’s entry decision
is constrained by the Internet service provider (ISP)’s network capacity. If capacity is
relatively large, prioritized services reduce the QoS investment as they become substitutes,
but improve traffic management. With limited capacity, by contrast, prioritized delivery
services are complementary to the CP’s investments and can facilitate entry of congestion-
sensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. Our
analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations
across mobile and fixed networks.
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1 Introduction
Net neutrality is the principle that all packets on the Internet must be treated equally in
their delivery regardless of their content source, destination, and type, and Internet service
providers (ISPs) cannot charge content providers for the provision of best efforts access.
The “open Internet” order in 2010 represents the U.S. Federal Communication Commission
(FCC)’s initial attempt at securing net neutrality, and has served as a focal guideline for
neutrality regulations.1 However, the FCC’s order has faced legal challenges by major ISPs
such as Comcast and Verizon Communications. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit concurred with the ISPs and ruled that the FCC overstepped
its authority.2 In response, on February 26, 2015, the FCC adopted new rules for broad-
band Internet service by reclassifying high-speed Internet service as a “telecommunications
service” rather than an “information service.”3 This seemingly technical maneuver allows
the FCC to circumvent the legal issue of its authority over Internet service and treat the
service as a public utility under Title II of the Telecommunications Act. Several lawsuits
were filed immediately after the FCC’s new rules; the court upheld the reclassification and
thus the net neutrality was legally protected. In this process, the issue of net neutrality
has emerged as the most important and controversial regulatory agenda since the inception
of the Internet.4 More recently, the new FCC chairman Ajit Pai outlined that high-speed
internet service should no longer be treated like a public utility with strict rules.5 Even so,
since broadband providers have conflicts of interests against content service providers and
vice versa, the controversy appears to be unabated continuously.
1FCC 10-201, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices (the
“FCC Order”), published in Fed. Reg. Vol. 76, No. 185, Sept. 23, 2011, went into effect on
November 20, 2011.
2See Comcast Corp. v. FCC (600 F.3d 642) and Verizon v. FCC (740 F.3d 623).
3FCC 15-24, In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, released on March
12, 2015.
4When the FCC asked for public opinions on new rules for the open Internet, it received a total
of approximately 3.7 million comments, making net neutrality by far the most-commented issue in
agency history. See “FCC received a total of 3.7 million comments on net neutrality” by Jacob
Kastrenakes in The Verge on September 16, 2014.
5See “F.C.C. Head Plots Course To Ease Rules On Internet” by Cecilia Kang in the The New
York Times on April 27, 2017.
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The extant literature on network neutrality has mainly focused on the expansion of
ISPs’ network capacity as innovation at the “core.” In this paper we focus on potential
implications of neutrality regulation on innovation incentives at the “edges” to reflect the
growing importance of content providers (CPs)’ investments in the modern Internet ecosys-
tem.6 More specifically, the ISPs’ capacity expansion making bigger “pipes” is not the
only solution to resolving the congestion problem. In fact, major content providers such
as Google, Netflix, and Amazon have developed various measures to improve the quality of
service (QoS) for their content and applications, independent of the ISP’s network infras-
tructure. They have pursued alternative technological solutions such as content distribution
(or delivery) networks (CDN)7 and advanced compression technology to ensure a sufficient
quality of service, without asking for preferential treatment of their own content (Xiao,
2008).8 Real-world anecdotal evidences regarding the importance of CDN technology can
be easily found. For example, Spotify (a Swedish commercial music streaming platform)
and Dailymotion (a French video site) have adopted CDN technology to make their con-
tent business more reliable (Economist, 2014). Malone, Jacob, and Nevo (2015) offer some
statistics regarding CDN using detailed residential broadband usage data: they report that
CDN applications are far more popular than file sharing protocols such as BitTorrent and
FTP but slightly less than online gaming such as Xbox Live and Clash of Clans or music
streaming services such as Spotify and Pandora.
From an end user’s perspective, the fundamental goal is to enjoy the highest quality
of service at a minimum fee; the channel through which this is achieved, either through
ISPs’ capacity investments or CPs’ CDN investments, is of little interest. In fact, the use
of CDNs is well acknowledged as one of the best ways to improve page load time which
6Networks constitute the “core”of the Internet while content, applications, and devices are at
the “edge.” See Reggiani and Valletti (2012) for more discussion on this.
7“CDN is to cache frequently accessed content in various geographical locations, and redirect
access requests of such content to the closest place. (. . . ) [B]y moving content closer to end users,
CDN can dramatically reduce delay, delay variation, and packet loss ratio for users’ applications and
thus their perception of network QoS (Xiao, 2008 p.117).”
8Greenstein, Peitz, and Valleti (2016) offers an excellent review on the network neutrality debate
and they provide why innovative investments by content providers are important and what kinds
of technologies are for these investments. Martin and Schuett (2016) also discuss innovative actions
taken by content providers and their implications for the network neutrality debate.
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critically affects any web experience. Unfortunately, researchers have seldom studied how
these new technological changes relate to regulatory decisions while regulators and policy-
makers need to understand how the network regulations would affect the content providers’
investments in alternative technology solutions (Maxwell and Brenner, 2012).
Reflecting technology advances at the edges of the Internet, we develop a theoretical
model to analyze the effects of net neutrality regulation on innovation incentives of major
content providers. To be consistent with the FCC’s interpretation, we characterize neutral-
ity regulation as not allowing for paid prioritization under which the ISPs can allocate some
traffic into a prioritized lane for a premium charge. In this setting, we find that the effects
of net neutrality regulation substantially depend on the relative size of the ISPs’ network
capacity vis-a`-vis major content providers’ bandwidth usage.
The intuition is as follows. If the network capacity is large enough, prioritized delivery
and QoS investment become substitutes. Consider a high network capacity case in which
the entry of new content is always warranted even without the prioritized service. On the
positive side, the prioritization results in more efficient traffic management by assigning
the faster delivery service to the more delay-sensitive content, which is referred to as the
“traffic management effect.” However, because the marginal benefit of the QoS investment
increases with the severity of network congestion, the MCP will invest less in a non-neutral
network compared to in a neutral network. In other words, the availability of the prioritized
service may dampen content providers’ incentives to invest in QoS. This logic is combined
with the standard argument that the ISP’s investment is suboptimal because it does not
fully incorporate the impact of its investment on the NCPs, which means non-internalized
externality. We refer to this force as the “QoS investment effect.”9 The social welfare
depends on the relative magnitude of these two forces, and we consider it more applicable
to the fixed network where the entry of content providers has not been treated as a serious
concern, relative to the mobile network where the network capacity can be a constraint on
the entry decision.
9Consistent with this insight, Xiao (2008) claims that major content providers have increased
their pursuit of quality of service through technological solutions rather than prioritization after the
FCC’s intensive efforts to apply network neutrality regulations.
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In contrast, with a limited network capacity, the paid prioritization can facilitate the
entry of a congestion-sensitive content provider while the entry may not be made under
neutral networks because the content provider may find it too costly to invest up to its
desired QoS. For this case, the prioritization complements innovation at the edges. The
newly available content would generate additional value to the network. However, the entry
of new content does not necessarily result in a higher social welfare. This is because the new
content can consume a substantial portion of the existing network capacity, which increases
the congestion for other content. Such a negative externality becomes more pronounced
with a limited network capacity. Indeed, the surplus from new content can be outweighed
by the efficiency loss from the elevated congestion for other content.
As several comprehensive reviews of the literature on net neutrality are available (e.g.,
Lee and Wu (2009), Schuett (2010), Lee and Hwang (2011), and Kra¨mer, Wiewiorra, and
Weinhardt (2013)) including the most recent article by Greenstein, Peitz, and Valletti
(2016), we briefly provide a selective review of notable works in relation to this paper.
The main focus of the extant studies has been investment incentives for the ISPs on their
“last mile” network capacity. In particular, proponents and opponents of the regulation
collide head-to-head on whether the content providers’ alleged free-riding would have a
chilling effect on the ISPs’ incentives to upgrade their “pipes.” Academic research on this
issue includes Musacchio, Schwartz, and Walrand (2009), Choi and Kim (2010), Cheng,
Bandyopadhyay and Guo (2011), Economides and Hermalin (2012), Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra
(2012), and Njoroge et al. (2013). A related issue is the content providers’ hold-up concern
that may result in no entry or less investment in content. This concern arises because
investments by high-value content providers may be expropriated ex post by ISPs who can
act as gatekeepers with paid prioritization services. For studies along this avenue, we refer
to Bandyopadhyay, Guo, and Cheng (2012), Choi and Kim (2010), Grafenhofer (2010),
Reggiani and Valletti (2016), and Bourreau, Kourandi, and Valletti (2015). We depart
from this literature by exploring new, but highly important, innovation channels adopted
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by major content providers such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Netflix.10
In this regard, Peitz and Schuett (2016) is closely related to our paper. They consider
so-called congestion control techniques that decrease packet losses during delivery to users
with an “inflation of traffic” by sending multiple redundant packets. This practice may be
privately optimal but aggravates the congestion problem on the network. They introduce the
tragedy of common property resources into the net neutrality discussion and show that net
neutrality regulation may lead to socially inefficient inflation of traffic whereas the socially
optimal allocation can be achieved with tiered pricing. They also look at compression in
an extension. Differentiated from them, in this article we study a high-bandwidth CP’s
QoS investments in alleviating network congestion focusing on various trade-offs associated
with such decision. Economides and Hermalin (2015) is related to our paper in that they
provide a new explanation for why ISPs offer plans with download caps by showing that
congestion externality can induce ISPs to use download limits as a mechanism to restrict the
aggregate bandwidth usage.11 Both papers deal with quality decisions by CPs and address
how congestion externalities affect social welfare, but through different channels.
As a policy implication, our findings suggest potential benefits of an asymmetric regula-
tory approach to mobile and fixed networks, which was adopted by the FCC’s 2010 Order,
but subsequently discarded with its reclassification of Internet service. The FCC justified
its discriminatory treatment of mobile networks by stating that “Mobile broadband is an
earlier-stage platform than fixed broadband, and ... [m]obile broadband speeds, capacity,
and penetration are typically much lower than for fixed broadband. (. . . ) In addition,
existing mobile networks present operational constraints that fixed broadband networks do
10There is a consensus on the basic premise that end-users’ quality of service must be the pri-
mary goal of a desirable network ecosystem (Xiao (2008), Altman et al. (2012), and Guo, Cheng,
and Bandyopadhyay (2013)). The ISP’s capacity investments and CPs’ CDN investments can be
alternative means to achieve this same goal.
11Recently, direct payments from consumers to content providers have received more attention
by researchers. Gans (2015) and Economides and Hermalin (2015) consider a setting in which
consumers need to pay content-specific prices to content providers, whereas Choi, Jeon, and Kim
(2015) consider micropayments in a reduced form represented as CPs’ business models. Jullien and
Sand-Zantman (2015) examine the net neutrality issues in the context of information transmission
such as signaling and screening.
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not typically encounter.”12 With a limited mobile network capacity, the paid prioritization
can facilitate the entry of a congestion-sensitive content provider while the entry is not
made under neutral networks because the content provider may find it too costly to invest
up to its desired QoS. For this case, the prioritization complements innovation at the edges,
and a lenient non-neutral treatment may facilitate the availability of innovative content and
applications in the early-stage mobile network.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section
2. In particular, a generalized queuing model is introduced to allow for a CP’s invest-
ment. In Section 3, we first characterize the first-best outcome and then analyze the QoS
investment decisions by the major content provider under neutral and non-neutral network
regimes. In Section 4, we examine the “intensive margin case” in which a network capacity
is large enough and thus a major content provider’s entry is warranted without a costly
QoS investment. In Section 5, we study the “extensive margin case” in which the network
capacity is limited such that a content provider’s entry becomes a critical issue. In Section
6, we extend our model to allow for the ISP’s investment in network capacity prior to the
entry of the major CP. We conclude in Section 7. Mathematical proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 ISP, CPs, and Consumers
We consider a monopolistic broadband ISP who is in charge of last mile delivery of online
content to end-users. Since we are primarily interested in major content providers’ indepen-
dent investment incentives to improve quality of service, we consider two types of content
providers: one major content provider (henceforth, simply referred to as ‘MCP’) such as
Google, Netflix, Disney, and Amazon Instant Video, and a continuum of other non-major
content providers (simply, ‘NCPs’) whose mass is normalized to one. This distinction al-
lows us to focus on an MCP’s investment decision to improve QoS for a successful content
12FCC 10-201, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices (the
2010 “FCC Order”), published in Fed. Reg. Vol. 76, No. 185, Sept. 23, 2011.
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business; the MCP’s relatively large scale of operation justifies the costly investment.
There is a continuum of homogeneous consumers whose mass is normalized to one. Let v
and V denote the consumer’s intrinsic utility from consuming the MCP’s content and NCPs’
respectively. Each consumer experiences some disutility from delays of content delivery due
to network congestion. We adopt an additive utility specification in which the net surplus
decreases in the average waiting time for both types of content, respectively denoted by w
and W . Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the sensitivity to delays across the
content they consume; some applications such as email are not sensitive as much as some
other such as streaming services. Each consumer earns the gross utility from each type of
content:  u(w) = v − kw for MCPU(W ) = V −W for NCPs (1)
where k ≥ 1 measures the relative sensitivity of the MCP’s content to delays compared to
NCPs’ of which sensitivity is normalized to one. Normalizing the mass of consumers to one,
u(w) and U(W ) also represent the entire surplus from each type of content.
For NCPs’ content, we introduce a parameter β ∈ [0, 1] to denote the ISP’s share of the
total surplus generated by NCPs’ content delivery. In other words, the ISP receives βU(W )
from providing delivery services for NCPs’ content; the rest of the surplus, (1 − β)U(W ),
is shared among NCPs and end users.13 One may regard β as a measure of the extent to
which the ISP internalizes any externality inflicted on NCPs and end users by its decisions.
If β = 0, the ISP will not take into account any potential effects on NCPs’ content traffic
when the ISP deals with the MCP. By contrast, if β = 1, the ISP will fully internalize the
externality. As will be clearer later, the parameter β plays an important role in assessing the
welfare effects of net neutrality regulations. The private and the social planner’s incentives
coincide when β = 1. However, for any β < 1, there may be a discrepancy between the
ISP’s optimal decision and the social planner’s, with the potential for discrepancy more
pronounced with a lower β.
Similarly, for the MCP’s content, let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the ISP’s share of the total net
13Since NCPs and consumers are “passive players” in our model, this simplification does not affect
any qualitative results in this article.
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surplus u(w) generated by the MCP’s content delivery. We assume that the MCP receives
the remainder of the surplus from its content delivery, (1 − α)u(w), and that consumers
receive zero surplus in both network regimes.14
2.2 Network Congestion, MCP’s Investment and QoS Improvement
Users initiate the Internet traffic through their “clicks” on desired content and become final
consumers of the delivered content. As a micro-foundation to model network congestion,
we adopt the standard M/M/1 queuing system which is considered a good approximation
to congestion in real computer networks.15
Let µ denote the ISP’s network capacity. Each consumer demands a wide range of
content from both the MCP and NCPs. The content request rate follows a Poisson process,
which represents the intensity of content demand. For NCPs’ content, we normalize the
arrival rate of the Poisson distribution and the size of packets for each content to one. Since
the mass of the NCPs is one, the overall demand parameter (i.e., the total volume of traffic)
for NCPs’ content is also normalized to one. By contrast, we envision the MCP as one
discrete player operating a content network platform that provides a continuum of content
whose aggregate packet size is given by λ. Then, we can interpret λ as the sheer volume of
the MCP’s content or a measure of the relative traffic volume of the MCP’s content vis-a`-vis
NCPs’ aggregate traffic volume.16 The total traffic volume for the ISP thus amounts to 1+λ
and we need the condition of µ > 1 + λ for a meaningful analysis of network congestion;
otherwise, the waiting time becomes infinity.
The MCP can make an investment of h ≥ 0 to enhance the quality of service in its
content delivery. As discussed earlier, the investment can take various forms, such as com-
pression technology to reduce packet size or content delivery networks (CDN) that shorten
14More generally, we can let the share of the consumers denoted by αC and the ISP’s share by
αI . Then, the MCP’s share will be αM = 1− αC − αI . Our assumption means αC = 0. If αC 6= 0,
the joint payoff of the ISP and the MCP in a non-neutral network will depend on αC . However,
none of our qualitative results will change with this consideration.
15Choi and Kim (2010), Cheong et al. (2011), Bourreau et al. (2015), Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra
(2012), inter alia, adopt the M/M/1 queuing model to analyze network congestion.
16For instance, if the MCP’s content mass is ξ and the packet size for each content is q, then we
have λ = ξ · q.
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the delivery distance by installing content servers at local data centers so that end-users’
demands are served by the closest data center.17 The common objective of all such invest-
ments is to speed up content delivery to enhance the user experience. We thus model them
simply as an investment in a compression technology that would reduce the traffic volume
of the MCP’s content from λ to aλ, where a = 11+h ∈ (0, 1]; more investment leads to a
smaller packet size for the MCP’s content. We assume the investment cost is increasing
and convex in the investment level, i.e., c′(h) > 0 and c′′(h) > 0, and satisfies the Inada
condition of c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0.
We consider two network regimes: neutral and non-neutral networks where subscript n
stands for neutral networks and d for non-neutral (discriminatory) networks. Consistent
with the literature and regulatory obligations, we take the availability of a paid prioritized
service as the defining characteristic that distinguishes the two network regimes. In the
neutral regime, there is no paid prioritization: all traffic is treated equally with every
packet being served according to the best-effort principle on a first-come-first-served basis.
In the non-neutral regime, ISPs are allowed to provide a two-tiered service with the paid
priority class packets delivered first. We assume that there is no charge for best efforts under
either regime. We focus on the last mile segment of the Internet where multiple ISPs make
interconnection agreements such as peering and it is typical that the ISPs facing uploading
CPs are different from the ISPs facing end-users. We do not question the interconnection
agreements among ISPs and simply allow for the possibility that if a uploading CP wants
its content delivered with prioritization at the last mile, then the ISP controlling the last
mile delivery can charge for the prioritized delivery.
In the neutral network, both the MCP’s and the NCPs’ content are delivered with the
same speed. More specifically, each user in the M/M/1 queuing system faces the following
17According to Xiao (2008), there are at large three different types of delays that account for the
total delay from one end of the network to the other: (1) end-point delay, (2) propagation delay, and
(3) link (or access) delay. Increasing speed of bottleneck links can be the most effective approach
to address (3), whereas caching or content delivery networks (CDN) helps to reduce (2). The ISP’s
capacity expansion at the last mile helps to reduce (1). While the total delay is collectively affected
by all these different types of delays, end-users typically cannot distinguish what type of delay
affected their perceived quality of service.
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total waiting time for the MCP’s content:
wn(a, µ) =
1
µ− (1 + aλ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
waiting time per packet
× aλ︸︷︷︸ .
total packet size
(2)
The total volume of traffic (packet size) amounts to 1 + aλ (one for NCPs’ content and aλ
for the MCP’s content with compression18), and thus the average waiting time per packet
is given by 1µ−(1+aλ) for both types of content. With the packet size of aλ for the MCP’s
content, the total waiting time is computed as (2). With no investment in the compression
technology (h = 0, or a = 1), the average waiting time reduces to 1µ−(1+λ) as in the standard
M/M/1 queuing system. For the NCP’s content, the total waiting is
Wn(a, µ) =
1
µ− (1 + aλ) × 1. (3)
because the total packet size for NCPs’ content is one.
Without neutrality obligations, the ISP may adopt a paid prioritization in which the
MCP can purchase the premium service at some price to send its content ahead of NCPs’
packets in queue so that the waiting time for the prioritized packets is given by
wd(a, µ) =
1
µ− aλ × aλ. (4)
The faster delivery of the prioritized packets is achieved at the expense of NCPs’ content.
Once the priority service is introduced, the non-prioritized content is delivered at a slower
speed; the waiting time for the “basic” service in the non-neutral network is given by
Wd(a, µ) =
µ
µ− (1 + aλ)
1
µ− aλ × 1. (5)
18Strictly speaking, queuing happens at the package level but compressions happen at data-
level so that the packet size is different from the packet quantity. However, here we use them
interchangeably because simple normalization can make this conversion possible. Specifically, let
λ = a · DMCPMTU where DMCP denotes the average data intensity of the MCP and MTU stands for
the maximum transmission unit. If we normalize the MTU and the average data intensity of NCPs
both to one, our notations make the two concepts interchangeable.
10
In what follows, when there is no confusion, we often suppress the dependence of a on h with
wr(h, µ) = wr(a(h), µ) and Wr(h, µ) = Wr(a(h), µ), where r = n, d.
2.3 Generalized Queuing System and Its Properties
Using (2)-(5), we can derive the following set of properties that are not only intuitive but
also serve collectively as an important micro-foundation for our analysis.
Property 1 The major content provider’s investment to enhance its own quality of service
generates positive spillover into other content in both neutral and non-neutral networks:
i.e.,
∂Wn
∂h
< 0 and
∂Wd
∂h
< 0.
Intuitively, less use of bandwidth from one content provider means more network capacity
for other content in a given network capacity.
Property 2 For a given pair of (a, µ), the prioritization makes the waiting time for
prioritized major CP’s content shorter, and the waiting time for non-major content longer
than the respective one in the neutral network: i.e.,
wd(a, µ) < wn(a, µ) and Wd(a, µ) > Wn(a, µ).
Property 3 For a given pair of (a, µ), the total waiting time is equal regardless of the
network regimes: i.e.,
wn(a, µ) +Wn(a, µ) = wd(a, µ) +Wd(a, µ).
This result extends the waiting cost equivalence characterized in Choi and Kim (2010),
Bourreau et al. (2015), Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra (2012) to a more generalized queuing system
that allows for a content provider’s investment for QoS enhancement and its spillover effects.
Intuitively, the total waiting time must depend on the network capacity and the total packet
size to be delivered regardless of whether or not a subset of the packets is prioritized.
Property 4 For a given pair of (a, µ), prioritizing the MCP’s traffic reduces the total delay
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cost: i.e., kwn(a, µ) +Wn(a, µ) > kwd(a, µ) +Wd(a, µ) for any k > 1.
This is because the MCP’s content is assumed to be more sensitive to congestion (k > 1) and
the prioritization allocates more congestion-sensitive content to the faster lane. Formally,
this property is proved by applying Properties 2 and 3:
[kwn(a, µ) +Wn(a, µ)]− [kwd(a, µ) +Wd(a, µ)] = (k − 1)[wn(a, µ)− wd(a, µ)] > 0.
2.4 Decision and Bargaining Timings
In the neutral network, an MCP’s decisions are straightforward since they do not involve a
bargaining situation with the ISP. The ISP cannot charge content providers for the provision
of best efforts access.
N-1. For a given ISP’s network capacity µ, the MCP makes a decision on whether to enter
the market. If the MCP enters, it chooses its investment level h.
N-2. For a given (µ, h), content is delivered to consumers and the payoffs are accordingly
realized.
In the non-neutral network, we need an additional stage in which the major CP and the
ISP bargain over the price of the prioritized service.
D-1. For a given µ, the MCP and the ISP bargain over the price of the prioritized service.19
D-2. With an agreement on the price of the prioritized service, the MCP makes its entry and
investment decisions taking the prioritized service into account. Without a mutual
agreement, the prioritized service is not introduced and, as in the neutral regime, all
traffic is delivered without any preferential treatment under the best effort principle.
The MCP’s entry and investment decisions remain the same as in the neutral regime.
D-3. Given (µ, h) and a priority class, content is delivered to consumers and the payoffs
are realized.
19This seems to be a reasonable assumption considering the MCP’s market power, as illustrated
by the recent deal between Netflix and Comcast. See “The Inside Story Of How Netflix Came
To Pay Comcast For Internet Traffic,” available at http://qz.com/256586/the-inside-story-of-how-
netflix-came-to-pay-comcast-for-internet-traffic.
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We assume the MCP’s investment is not contractible in that the MCP and the ISP can
agree only on the priority price, but the investment decision is solely left to the MCP.
3 Optimal QoS Investment and Network Regimes
3.1 Benchmark: The First-best
We first characterize the first-best outcome (given a network capacity µ) in which the social
planner can control the MCP’s entry and QoS investment decisions as well as the network
regime. Note that the comparison of alternative network regimes is meaningful only when
the MCP’s entry is relevant. If there is no entry, the determination of the network regime
in the first-best outcome is vacuous because there is only one type of content provider. We
thus focus on the case in which the social planner induces the entry of the MCP. Denote
the socially optimal QoS investment level in each network regime by hFBr for r = n, d that
is characterized as follows: for a given µ
hFBr = arg min
hr
Ψr(h) = kwr(h, µ) +Wr(h, µ) + c(h). (6)
Then, we can establish the following intuitive result.
Proposition 1 (First-Best Comparison) Suppose that the social planner induces the
entry of the major CP. Then, for k > 1, the first-best non-neutral network is always superior
in welfare to the first-best neutral network.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 tells us that the first-best outcome always entails a non-neutral network
when the MCP’s entry is socially desirable because it allows a more efficient traffic manage-
ment compared to a neutral network (Property 4). This result suggests that net neutrality
regulation can be justified only as a second-best policy when the entry and the investment
decisions are left to the private parties. In fact, our subsequent analysis reveals that a
second-best neutral network can provide a higher social welfare than a second-best non-
neutral network.
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3.2 Neutral Networks
Consider a neutral network in which all packets are equally treated based on the first-come-
first-served principle. As usual, we proceed with backward induction and distinguish two
subgames depending on whether or not the MCP has entered. Assuming the MCP’s entry,
the MCP’s optimal choice of h is to maximize its profit:
max
h≥0
pin = (1− α)[v − kwn(h, µ)]− c(h),
where wn(h, µ) =
λ
(µ−1)(1+h)−λ from (2). The first-order condition with respect to h becomes
∂pin
∂h
∣∣∣∣
h∗n
=
(1− α)kλ(µ− 1)
[(µ− 1)(1 + h)− λ]2 − c
′(h) = 0, (7)
for an interior solution h∗n. The marginal benefit of the investment decreases in the ISP’s
network capacity, which is easily confirmed by the cross-partial derivative ∂∂µ
(
∂pin
∂h
)
< 0. Let
pi∗n(µ) ≡ pin(h∗n(µ), µ) denote the maximized profit of the MCP at the optimal investment
level h∗n(µ) for a given network capacity µ. Applying the envelope theorem, we find that
the MCP obtains a higher profit as the network capacity increases:
dpi∗n
dµ
=
∂pi∗n
∂µ
= −k(1− α)∂wn(h
∗
n, µ)
∂µ
= k
(1− α)λ(1 + h∗n)
[(µ− 1)(1 + h∗n)− λ]2
> 0. (8)
This relationship implies that a threshold network capacity µ
n
exists such that pi∗n(µ) ≥ 0
if and only if µ ≥ µ
n
. For a sufficiently low capacity µ < µ
n
, the investment cost is too
high to justify entry into the content service market. Hence, there is a discontinuity in the
MCP’s investment at the threshold value µ
n
: no entry (and thus no investment) for µ < µ
n
but h∗n > 0 for µ ≥ µn. Furthermore, we analyze how the (interior) optimal investment h∗n
changes with the capacity level for µ > µ
n
and establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The MCP’s QoS investment decreases in the ISP’s network capacity µ, i.e.,
∂h∗n
∂µ < 0 for µ ≥ µn.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We can illustrate the optimal QoS investment in the neutral network as in Figure 1: h∗n = 0
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Figure 1: Optimal QoS Investment in the Neutral Network
for µ < µ
n
and then h∗n > 0 and
∂h∗n
∂µ < 0 for µ ≥ µn.
Note that the threshold level of network capacity µ
n
depends on α and k. As either α
or k increases, the MCP’s optimized profit decreases and thus µ
n
increases. For notational
brevity, we will use the simple notation µ
n
unless this concise notation causes any confusion.
3.3 Non-neutral Networks
Now consider a non-neutral network in which the MCP has an option to buy a prioritized
delivery service at a negotiated price. One benefit of such an arrangement is that the
MCP can achieve the same quality of service with a lower investment in the compression
technology due to the preferential treatment of its content delivery. The analysis for the
non-neutral network proceeds similarly as in the neutral network. Suppose that the MCP
and the ISP agree on the terms of the prioritized service.20 We define the MCP’s profit
gross of any payout for the priority as
pid ≡ (1− α) [v − kwd(h, µ)]− c(h), (9)
20We assume that there is efficient bargaining between the ISP and the MCP. See section 4.1 for
a discussion of alternative pricing schemes in which the ISP unilaterally sets a price for prioritized
delivery of the MCP’s traffic and the price depends on the amount of data carried.
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where wd(h, µ) =
λ
µ(1+h)−λ . The first-order condition for the MCP’s optimal investment
decision with the prioritized service (h∗d) yields the following equation:
∂pid
∂h
∣∣∣∣
h∗d
=
k(1− α)λµ
[µ(1 + h)− λ]2 − c
′(h) = 0. (10)
Defining pi∗d(µ) ≡ pid(h∗d(µ), µ), we can show that the maximized profit increases in the
network capacity, i.e.,
dpi∗d
dµ
=
∂pid
∂µ
= −k(1− α)∂wd(h
∗
d, µ)
∂µ
= k
(1− α)λ(1 + h)
[µ(1 + h)− λ]2 > 0,
and the optimal investment decreases in the capacity,
∂h∗d
∂µ < 0.
21
While the investment decision h∗d is independent of β, the price of prioritization must
be affected by the level of β because the paid prioritization will make the ISP earn less
from NCPs’ content due to increased delay for non-prioritized content. The ISP would ask
for compensation from the MCP for the loss via the priority price. The ISP’s incentive to
provide the prioritized service would be higher as β becomes smaller. In this section, we
analyze the case of β = 0, in which the MCP’s entry is facilitated to the maximum extent,
and relegate the analysis of β > 0 to the next section. In particular, if β = 0, the ISP and
the MCP will agree on some price of prioritization whenever the surplus from the entry
is non-negative, i.e., v − kwd(h∗d(µ), µ) − c(h∗d(µ)) ≥ 0. As the MCP’s profit pi∗d(µ) strictly
increases with µ as in the neutral network, there will be another threshold capacity µ
d
such
that pi∗d(µ) ≥ 0 if and only if µ ≥ µd. Again, the MCP’s investment discretely jumps up
at the threshold µ
d
, then decreases with µ for µ > µ
d
. Because pi∗d(µ) > pi
∗
n(µ) and pi
∗
d(µ)
increases in µ, we must have µ
n
> µ
d
.22
The last step needed to compare h∗n and h∗d is to verify that the marginal benefit of
the QoS investment is greater in the neutral network compared to that in the non-neutral
network. The reason is that the marginal benefit from reducing the content delivery size
21The proof is omitted as it is similar to the process leading to Lemma 1 in Section 3.2.
22Again we note that the threshold level of network capacity in a non-neutral network, µ
d
, depends
not only on α and k as in the neutral regime but also on β in the non-neutral one. As we discuss in
the next subsection, this result holds for a small β. If β is sufficiently large and close to 1, we cannot
rule out the possibility that this inequality is reversed.
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increases with the severity of congestion in the network, as shown below.
∂pin
∂h
>
∂pid
∂h
because
∣∣w′n(h)∣∣ = λ(1− α)(µ− 1)[(µ− 1)(1 + h)− λ]2 > λ(1− α)µ[µ(1 + h)− λ]2 = ∣∣w′d(h)∣∣ .
Consequently, we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The MCP reduces its QoS investment with the purchase of the prioritization
service, i.e., h∗n(µ) > h∗d(µ), for all µ > µn.
3.4 Network Capacity and QoS Investments
Based on Lemmas 1-2, we can summarize the MCP’s optimal investment decisions for β = 0
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose β = 0.
(i) For a limited network capacity of µ ∈ [µ
d
, µ
n
), a paid prioritization and MCP’s invest-
ment are “complements” in that prioritization induces the MCP to enter and make a
positive investment, whereas the MCP does not enter in the neutral network.
(ii) For a larger capacity µ > µ
n
, prioritization and MCP’s investment are “substitutes”
in that purchasing prioritization reduces the MCP’s QoS investment, compared to the
investment that would be made in the neutral network.
We illustrate the optimal QoS investments in both network regimes in Figure 2. For
the range of µ
d
< µ < µ
n
, there is the greater QoS investment under the non-neutral
network compared to the neutral network. The reversal relationship occurs when µ > µ
n
.
Intuitively, the prioritization reduces the QoS investment incentives because it provides an
alternative technological solution to achieve the desired level of QoS.
Our analysis shows that the MCP’s entry crucially depends on the ISP’s network ca-
pacity. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the limited capacity case of µ ∈ [µ
d
, µ
n
)
as “extensive margin case” and the high capacity case of µ > µ
n
as “intensive margin case”
in the sense that the MCP’s entry is a focal issue in the former but not in the latter.
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Figure 2: Optimal QoS investments, Net Neutrality, and Network Capacity
Remark 1 For any (α, β), we may compare the relative levels of the two thresholds,
µ
n
(α) and µ
d
(α, β). Let µ
d
(α, β) denote the network capacity at which the MCP’s entry
with prioritization yields the same joint payoff of the two bargaining parties with no entry,
i.e., µ
d
(α, β) is defined as
v − kw∗d(µ)− c(h∗d(µ))− β [W ∗d (µ)−Wn(φ, µ)] = 0
where φ stands for no entry of the MCP. We find that µ
d
(α, β) increases with β if k is
large enough and µ
d
(α, 0) < µ
n
(α) for any α ∈ [0, 1].23 However, the socially optimal entry
threshold µ
d
(α, 1) may or may not be higher than µ
n
(α). If we have µ
d
(α, 1) < µ
n
(α), the
above distinction of the extensive and intensive margin cases is preserved and the entry
becomes socially desirable. By contrast, if we have µ
d
(α, 1) > µ
n
(α), then there will be a
cutoff level of β denoted by β˜(< 1) such that µ
d
(α, β˜) ≤ µ
n
(α) if and only if β ≤ β˜. In
what follows, we restrict our attention to the case where µ
d
(α, β) < µ
n
(α) holds.24
23The proof is available from the authors upon request.
24If µ
d
(α, β) > µ
n
(α), the extensive margin case we discuss in section 5 does not arise.
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4 The Intensive Margin Case
In this section we consider the intensive margin case in which the network capacity is large
enough to induce the major content provider’s entry regardless of the network regimes, i.e.,
µ ≥ µ
n
. In other words, now the MCP’s content is available without a prioritized service.
Recall that the joint payoffs of the ISP and the MCP are given in the network regime
r = n, d as follows:
Πr(h, µ, β) = v − kwr(h, µ)− c(h) + β[V −Wr(h, µ)]. (11)
Hence, the prioritization will be adopted if the two parties find the non-neutral regime
better than the neutral treatment: i.e.,
∆ΠI(µ, β) = Πd(h
∗
d(µ), µ, β)−Πn(h∗n (µ) , µ, β) > 0, (12)
where the superscript I indicates that we are considering the intensive margin case and
∆ΠI(µ, β) > 0 means a higher joint payoff under the non-neutral network. For the intensive
margin case, we find that a non-neutral network may generate a trade-off between superior
traffic management and more severe under-investment problem.
4.1 Traffic Management vs. Under-investment
The effects of the prioritization on the joint payoff can be decomposed into two parts: (1)
static traffic management effect and (2) dynamic QoS investment effect. Formally, it yields
that
∆ΠI(µ, β) = [Πd(h
∗
d(µ), µ, β)−Πn(h∗d (µ) , µ, β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Traffic Management Effect (+)
+ [Πn(h
∗
d(µ), µ, β)−Πn(h∗n (µ) , µ, β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
QoS Investment Effect (−)
.
(13)
The first term in (13) is always positive and we refer to it as the “traffic management effect”:
for a given QoS investment level h, prioritizing the MCP’s traffic reduces the total delay
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cost because the MCP’s content is more sensitive to congestion (k > 1). Precisely, we have
Traffic Management Effect = Πd(h
∗
d(µ), µ, β)−Πn(h∗d (µ) , µ, β) (14)
= k[wn(h
∗
d(µ))− wd(h∗d(µ))] + β [Wn(h∗d(µ))−Wd(h∗d(µ))]
= k[wn(h
∗
d(µ))− wd(h∗d(µ))]− β [wn(h∗d(µ))− wd(h∗d(µ))]
= (k − β)[wn(h∗d(µ))− wd(h∗d(µ))] ≥ 0
where the third equality in (14) is obtained from Property 3, wn(h
∗
d) +Wn(h
∗
d) = wd(h
∗
d) +
Wd(h
∗
d).
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We refer to the second square bracket in (13) as the “QoS investment effect”: the
availability of a prioritized service will decrease the MCP’s investment level from h∗n (µ) to
h∗d (µ) (Lemma 2), which in turn affects the resulting joint payoff. To determine the sign of
this term, let hJn (µ, β) denote the MCP’s investment choice that maximizes the joint profit
of the two parties in the neutral regime, i.e.,
hJn (β) = arg max
h
Πn(h, µ, β) = v − kwn(h, µ)− c(h) + β[V −Wn(h, µ)] (15)
which is alternatively defined as
hJn (β) = arg min
h
kwn(h, µ) + c(h) + βWn(h, µ). (16)
From the profit maximization problem (15), we can see that the MCP’s private optimal
choice, h∗n(µ) that maximizes v−kwn(h, µ)−c(h), fails to incorporate its positive externality
on the NCPs’ content. The joint decision on the QoS investment internalizes only part of
such externality, βWn(h). Thus, the joint decision yields an under-investment problem.
This logic can be seen from the cost minimization problem (16) in which the MCP chooses
h∗n(µ) to minimize kwn(h)+c(h), but ignores the additional cost βWn(h). In short, in either
interpretation, we find that an under-investment problem persists in that h∗n(µ) < hJn (µ, β)
25All the derivations in (14) hold for any h, not just for h∗d(µ). We evaluated the inequality at
the optimal QoS choice.
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for any β > 0. This result combined with Lemma 2, h∗d(µ) < h
∗
n(µ),
26 proves that the QoS
investment effect must be negative:
QoS Investment Effect = Πn(h
∗
d (µ) , µ, β)−Πn(h∗n (µ) , µ, β) < 0. (17)
We should mention that the result on the MCP’s QoS investment depends on our as-
sumption that there is efficient bargaining between the ISP and the MCP. We discuss the
robustness of our results to alternative bargaining assumptions in section 4.4.
4.2 Effects of Prioritization on Social Welfare
We now analyze a social planner’s incentive to introduce the paid prioritization and compare
it with the private incentive. We consider the constrained (second-best) social optimum in
which the social planner can choose the network regime only, but the QoS investment is left
to the MCP’s decision. The social welfare in each regime coincides with the joint payoff of
the ISP and the MCP when β = 1 for (11), which is given by
Sr(µ) = Πr(h
∗
r(µ), µ, β = 1) = v − kwr(h∗r(µ), µ)− c(h∗r(µ)) + [V −Wr(h∗r(µ), µ)], (18)
where r = n, d. Let ∆S(µ) be the effect of the prioritization service on social welfare:
∆S(µ) = Sd(µ)− Sn(µ)
= ∆ΠI(µ, β) + (1− β) [Wn(h∗n)−Wd(h∗d)] . (19)
As is clearly seen, if β = 1, the private incentive to adopt the prioritization service is per-
fectly aligned with the social incentive (i.e., ∆S(µ) = ∆ΠI(µ, 1)). For any uninternalized
externality with β < 1, however, we have socially excessive adoption of the paid prioriti-
zation as the ISP and the MCP would not fully internalize the effect of increased delay on
26Note that the objective function [kwn(h) + βWn(h)] + c(h) in the minimization problem is a
convex function of h because each component of wn(h), Wn(h), and c(h) is also convex in h. The
convexity of the objective function warrants the clear comparison.
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NCPs’ content which is represented by
∆S(µ)−∆ΠI(µ, β) = (1− β) [Wn(h∗n)−Wd(h∗d)]︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
externality on NCPs’ content
(20)
We can further decompose the externality term in (20) and show ∆S(µ) < ∆ΠI(µ, β) as
follows:
Wn(h
∗
n)−Wd(h∗d) = [Wn(h∗n)−Wn(h∗d)] + [Wn(h∗d)−Wd(h∗d)] < 0. (21)
The first term of (21) has a negative sign because of Lemma 2 (h∗n > h∗d), and the second
term also takes a negative value following Property 2. Lastly, we notice that the discrepancy
between the social incentives and the private incentives is inversely related to β. Interest-
ingly, we find that if the discrepancy reaches its maximum (β = 0), the ISP and the MCP
will always find it profitable to adopt the prioritization in the non-neutral network regard-
less of whether the neutrality regulation would give higher social welfare. To see this, we
verify the following:
∆ΠI(µ, β = 0) = [v − kwd(h∗d(µ), µ)− c(h∗d(µ))]− [v − kwn(h∗n(µ), µ)− c(h∗n(µ))](22)
≥ [v − kwd(h∗n(µ), µ)− c(h∗n(µ))]− [v − kwn(h∗n(µ), µ)− c(h∗n(µ))]
= k[wn(h
∗
n(µ), µ)− wd(h∗n (µ) , µ)] ≥ 0,
where the first (weak) inequality comes from the revealed preference argument and the last
inequality from Property 2. Proposition 3 summarizes findings thus far for the intensive
margin case.
Proposition 3 Consider the intensive margin case with network capacity µ > µ
n
in which
the MCP always enters. Then, we find
(i) A prioritization service involves a trade-off between the positive efficient traffic man-
agement effect and the negative QoS investment effect.
(ii) In general, there exist socially excessive incentives to adopt a prioritization service
unless β = 1.
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4.3 Net Neutrality as a Second-Best Policy
One interesting policy implication from our study is that net neutrality regulation can
be an optimal second-best policy. For the second-best comparison, let us focus on the
trade-off between the traffic management and QoS investment effects. Note that the traffic
management effect increases with k at the rate of [wn(h
∗
d(µ))−wd(h∗d(µ))] as is seen in (14).
On the other hand, the QoS investment effect increases with k at the rate of [wn(h
∗
n(µ))−
wn(h
∗
d(µ))] which can be confirmed in (17). In order to compare these two slopes, note that
wn(h
∗
d(µ)) + wn(h
∗
d(µ)) > wn(h
∗
n(µ)) + wd(h
∗
d(µ)).
because h∗d(µ) < h
∗
n(µ) implies wn(h
∗
d(µ)) > wn(h
∗
n(µ)) and Property 2 states wn(h
∗
d(µ)) >
wd(h
∗
d(µ)). The condition above is equivalent to
wn(h
∗
d(µ))− wd(h∗d(µ)) > wn(h∗n(µ))− wn(h∗d(µ)),
that is, the traffic management effect is more sensitively responding to k than the QoS
investment effect. This implies that there exists k∗ (> 1) below which net neutrality can
be justified as the second-best policy because net neutrality is always preferred for the case
of k = 1 as explained below.
Below we offer a numerical example that illustrates this point clearly. According to
Proposition 1, in the first-best world, non-neutrality yields a higher welfare than neutrality
because of the traffic management effect (there is no QoS investment effect in the first-best).
However, as the below example shows, this is no longer the case in the second-best world
because the under-investment problem is more severe in a non-neutral network than in a
neutral network. For explicit derivations, let us consider a cost function of c(h) = h2 and
set the values of parameters µ = 3, λ = 2, α = 0, v = 5, V = 3 for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Table 1
shows the contrast between the first-best and the second-best outcomes.
The comparison between optimal QoS investments shows that the under-investment
problems occur in both network regimes (i.e., hFBn > h
∗
n, h
FB
d > h
∗
d), but the extent of
the under-investment is larger in the non-neutral network (hFBd − h∗d > hFBn − h∗n) where
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Table 1: First-Best vs. Second-Best
k h∗n h∗d h
FB
n h
FB
d S
∗
d − S∗n SFBd − SFBn
1 0.693 0.406 1.145 1.145 −1.213 0.000
2 0.874 0.559 1.357 1.242 −0.120 0.511
3 1.000 0.667 1.518 1.330 0.472 0.912
the MCP reduces its investment because the quality of service can be enhanced through
prioritization.
When one considers the symmetric waiting cost, i.e., k = 1, the first-best outcome is
the same in both network regimes (SFBd = S
FB
n ). For the second-best, the neutral network
is better (S∗d < S
∗
n) because of the less severe under-investment problem in the neutral
network and zero efficiency gains from traffic management by prioritization. For a modest
asymmetry in the congestion costs (k = 2), the non-neutral network outperforms the neutral
network for the first-best (SFBd > S
FB
n ) because the efficiency gain via the better traffic
management gives rise to a higher first-best welfare in the non-neutral network (Proposition
1). However, the opposite holds for the second-best (S∗d < S
∗
n): the more severe negative
effect of the under-investment problem in the non-neutral network outweighs the positive
traffic management effect (Proposition 3). If k is sufficiently large (k = 3), such conflict
disappears. Now the non-neutral network starts to give higher social welfare both in the
first-best and second-best sense because the traffic management effect dominates the QoS
investment effect even in the second-best outcome.
The potential necessity of net neutrality regulations as a second-best policy is reminis-
cent of Choi et al. (2015). While our finding sounds similar, the logic differs. In our earlier
work, we show that a menu of multiple qualities may yield an excessive quality distortion
for the basic service such that the resulting social welfare is even lower in the non-neutral
network than in the neutral network. Here, this possibility comes from the substitution
between the QoS investment and the prioritization available only under the non-neutral
network.
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4.4 Robustness of the Results to Alternative Priority Pricing Schemes
We point out that the result on the MCP’s QoS investment depends on our assumption
that there is efficient bargaining between the ISP and the MCP.27 This implies that the
MCP’s investment does not depend on the price of priority. If we consider alternative
pricing schemes in which (a) the ISP unilaterally sets a price for prioritized delivery of the
MCP’s traffic and (b) the price depends on the amount of data carried, our results can be
modified in the following way for α = 0.
Suppose, for instance, the ISP sets a linear tariff with a constant price per unit of traffic.
In such a case, we have actually overinvestment compared to social optimum if β is very
large and close to 1. The reason is that the ISP will generally set a price that exceeds the
socially efficient level in an attempt to extract rents from the MCP, which in turn would
increase the MCP’s incentives to avoid such charges by investing in QoS. To be more
precise, let p denote per unit price of prioritized traffic. The MCP then chooses its QoS
investment level a(= 11+h) to maximize pid ≡ [v − kwd(a)]− c(a)− pλa with associated first
order condition −kw′d(a) − c′(a) = pλ, where c(a) = c(h−1(a)). The first order condition
implicitly defines the inverse demand p(a) facing the ISP. The ISP’s problem is
max
a
β(V −Wd(a)) + p(a)λa = β(V −Wd(a))− a(kw′d(a) + c′(a))
leading to the first order condition
−W ′d(a)− kw′d(a)− c′(a) + (1− β)W ′d(a)− a(kw
′′
d (a) + c
′′
(a)) = 0 (23)
The social planner’s first order condition is given by
−W ′d(a)− kw′d(a)− c′(a) = 0 (24)
A comparison of the two first order conditions (23) and (24) reveals that there are two
27We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this one out and kindly providing us with some
analysis on this, which we replicate below.
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types of distortions in the market equilibrium under a discriminatory network, represented
by (1 − β)W ′d(a) and −a(kw
′′
d (a) + c
′′
(a)). The first one, (1 − β)W ′d(a) > 0, is due to the
failure to fully internalize the effect of a on NCPs’ waiting time, which leads to insufficient
QoS investment by the MCP. The second one, −a(kw′′d (a)+c
′′
(a))(< 0), is due to the ISP’s
monopoly distortion in the absence of efficient bargaining and mitigates the first effect as
it goes in the opposite direction from the first effect. In particular, if β is sufficiently large
and close to 1, the second effect dominates the first one and we can have overinvestment by
the MCP compared to the social optimum under a linear tariff pricing scheme.
However, if we consider a more general scheme of two-part tariff, we can restore the
underinvestment result. To see this, suppose that the ISP offers a two-part tariff of (p, F ),
where p is per unit price of prioritized traffic and F is a fixed fee. When the ISP sets a per-
unit traffic price of p to induce a traffic of a, the following individual rationality condition
should be satisfied:
[v − kwd(a)]− c(a)− pλa− F ≥ u,
where u is the payoff of the MCP when it rejects an offer by the ISP and its traffic is treated
equally with NCPs’ content. Thus, the highest fixed fee that can be charged is given by
F (a) = [v − kwd(a)]− c(a)− p(a)λa− u. The MCP’s problem with a two-part tariff can be
written as
max
a
β(V −Wd(a)) + p(a)λa+ F (a) = β(V −Wd(a)) + [v − kwd(a)]− c(a)− u
The first order condition is given by
−βW ′d(a)− kw′d(a)− c′(a) = 0 (25)
It immediately follows that the MCP has less incentives to invest in QoS compared to the
social optimum by comparing (24) and (25). The MCP has the same incentives as the
social planner only when β = 1, that is, only when the ISP fully extracts all surplus and
internalizes any externality caused by the prioritized service. Otherwise, we restore the
underinvestment result compared to the social optimum.
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The comparison of MCP’s investment levels across the discriminatory and neutral regimes,
however, is more complicated. With a two part tariff, we can show that our result is robust
if β is small and close to zero whereas we have more investment in the discriminatory regime
if β = 1. This implies that there is a critical level of β below which our current result holds.
To be more specific, the first order condition for the MCP’s investment under a neutral
regime is given by
−kw′n(a)− c′(a) = 0 (26)
A comparison of (25) and (26) indicates that we have more QoS investment under the
neutral regime if either β is small or k is large enough because w′n(a) > w′d(a). However, we
cannot rule out the possibility of more investment in the discriminatory regime if kw′n(a) >
W ′d(a)+kw
′
d(a). This condition implies that there is more investment in the discriminatory
when β = 1. Note that the MCP’s QoS investment under the neutral system is independent
of β whereas its investment under the discriminatory regime is increasing in β. Therefore,
if the condition holds, there is a critical level of β ∈ (0, 1), β∗, such that the MCP’s QoS
investment is lower under the discriminatory system with a two-part tariff if β < β∗. The
intuition for this possibility can be explained as follows. As β increases, the ISP takes into
account the effect of congestion on NCPs. One instrument to mitigate congestion from
the perspective of the ISP is to raise the unit price of prioritized traffic (as in congestion
pricing), which induces the MCP to invest more in QoS. It thus implies that the efficiency
rationale for prioritization is stronger under a two-part tariff than under efficient bargaining
if β is sufficiently large.
Lastly, we discuss what happens if we modify our model such that the ISP can charge
both NCPs and MCP even for the best-effort basic service under non-neutrality. This
change implies that β becomes endogenous at β = 1 because NCPs are homogeneous in our
model and the ISP will extract all their surplus. In the bargaining between the MCP and
the ISP, they will choose the outcome that maximizes their joint surplus among the three
following options: (i) no entry, (ii) entry with a prioritized service, and (iii) entry without a
prioritized service. The default option for the MCP is no entry. They will share the surplus
from entry regardless of whether it is done with or without prioritization. We thus find that
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the full surplus extraction from the NCPs (by charging a price for non-prioritized service)
together with efficient bargaining with the MCP leads to a socially optimal outcome both
in terms of entry decision and prioritization decision.28 One important difference from the
main analysis is that the MCP’s entry with a non-prioritized service is also on the table
for negotiation. As a result, we cannot claim that entry always occur with prioritization as
long as entry occurs without prioritization. The entry with prioritized service, compared to
the entry without prioritized service, has the benefit of improving the traffic management
at the cost of reducing the MCP’s investment.
5 The Extensive Margin Case
In this section let us analyze the effects of net neutrality regulation on various participants
when the MCP makes no entry under the neutral regime because pi∗n(µ) < 0 for µ < µn
but the entry becomes possible in the non-neutral network. We consider a general situation
with β ∈ [0, 1].
Here we attempt to make two points. First, we find that the paid prioritization can
facilitate the entry of a congestion-sensitive content provider while the entry may not be
made under neutral networks because the content provider may find it too costly to invest
up to its desired QoS. For this case, the prioritization complements innovation at the edges.
Second, the newly available content would generate additional value to the network, but
the entry of new content not necessarily results in a higher social welfare. This is because
the new content can consume a substantial portion of the existing network capacity, which
increases the congestion for other content. Indeed, the surplus from new content can be
outweighed by the efficiency loss from the elevated congestion for other content. Below we
provide a simple analysis for these two results.
Under a non-neutral network, an MCP’s entry has two countervailing effects. On the
one hand, the new content generates a positive surplus v − kwd(h∗d(µ), µ), which can be
shared by the MCP and the ISP with Nash bargarining. On the other hand, the entry
exacerbates the network congestion through the following two channels: the additional
28A detailed analysis is available from the authors upon request.
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bandwidth taken by the MCP’s new content means more congestion for a given network
capacity; additionally the prioritized delivery of the MCP’s content means a slower delivery
for NCPs’ content. Formally, we examine the difference in waiting time for the NCPs’
content with the introduction of a two-tiered service, ∆W, that can be decomposed into
two parts.
∆W ≡ Wd(h∗d(µ), µ)−Wn(φ, µ)
= [Wn(h
∗
d(µ), µ)−Wn(φ, µ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+) due to new content entry
+ [Wd(h
∗
d(µ), µ)−Wn(h∗d(µ), µ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+) due to different priority classes
, (27)
where we remind that φ stands for no entry of the MCP. The first bracketed term in (27)
measures the increase in delivery time even in the absence of prioritization due to increased
traffic volume with the MCP’s entry. The second one captures the NCP content’s waiting
time increase due to the prioritization for a given QoS investment hd. On both accounts,
NCPs suffer from longer delivery time, i.e., ∆W > 0. We confirm this intuition formally by
showing that
∆W =
a∗dλ (2µ− a∗dλ− 1)[
µ− (1 + a∗dλ)
]
(µ− a∗dλ) (µ− 1)
> 0 for any a∗d ∈ (0, 1].
where µ > 1 + λ is assumed in the model.
The prioritized service will be provided to the MCP and its price will be agreed upon
between the ISP and the MCP if their joint profits increase with the service. The joint profits
under the neutral regime will be given by Πn(φ, µ) = β [V −Wn(φ, µ)] because there is no
entry in the neutral network. With a priority service in the non-neutral network, their joint
profits are given by Πd(h
∗
d(µ), µ) = v−kwd(h∗d(µ), µ)−c(h∗d(µ))+β[V −Wd(h∗d(µ), µ)]. The
change in joint profits due to introduction of the prioritization can be written as follows:29
∆ΠE(µ, β) ≡ Πd(h∗d(µ), µ, β)−Πn(φ, µ, β) = v − kwd(h∗d(µ), µ)− c(h∗d(µ))− β∆W, (28)
where the superscript E in ∆ΠE denotes that we consider the extensive margin case. As
29Note that ∆W does not depend on β because h∗d is independent of β.
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(28) clearly shows, the MCP’s entry generates the additional value of v− kwd(h∗d(µ), µ) net
of the MCP’s investment cost c(h∗d(µ)) whereas the ISP must bear the loss of β∆W due to its
negative effects on NCPs. Recalling ∆ΠE(µ, β = 1) is equal to the change in social welfare
from the MCP’s entry, one can immediately see that any private incentives to introduce
a prioritized service under β < 1 exceeds the socially optimal incentives. Specifically, the
discrepancy between the private and social incentives is measured by (1−β)∆W (µ), which
is inversely related to β. If β = 1, the ISP completely internalizes the effects on consumers
and NCPs, with the private and social incentives coinciding. Proposition 4 summarizes our
findings in this section.
Proposition 4 Consider the extensive margin case. Then, the paid prioritization can fa-
cilitate the entry of a congestion-sensitive content. This newly available content generates
a positive surplus to the network. The ISP’s private incentives to introduce a prioritized
service under β < 1 exceeds the socially optimal incentives.
The MCP’s entry can be either welfare-increasing or welfare-decreasing. If we want to
discuss this point rigorously, we need somewhat lengthy mathematical derivations but here
let us briefly deliver the main insight.30 First, ∆ΠE(µ, β) always increases with µ for an
arbitrary β ∈ [0, 1] if the delay sensitivity parameter k is sufficiently large. This is because
the social benefit of assigning a fast lane to the MCP’s content increases with k, while the
negative effect of the entry on NCPs’ content remains constant for a given β. Second, the
MCP’s entry is less likely to occur for a greater β as the ISP’s loss from the higher level
of network congestion increases with β. Then, we find that for a small enough β the MCP
decides to enter with prioritization but such entry is not socially efficient.
However, it is also possible that the MCP decides not to enter with prioritization even
when the entry is socially desirable once we consider a different environment than the one
on which Proposition 4 is based. For example, suppose that consumers are heterogeneous
and some consumers enjoy a positive surplus from the MCP’s content. As the ISP does not
take such surplus into account when it decides whether to adopt the prioritization or not,
it is possible that socially desirable prioritization may not be adopted by the ISP.
30Rigorous mathematical derivations are available from the authors upon request.
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6 ISP’s Capacity Choice
Thus far we focused on the MCP’s QoS investment for a given ISP’s network capacity. To
study potential interplay between the ISP’s capacity choice and the MCP’s entry/investment
decisions, we augment our model by letting the ISP choose its network capacity µ before
all subsequent plays ensue. Let C(µ) denote the investment cost of capacity µwith C ′ > 0
and C ′′ > 0.
Let us begin with a summary of our findings with intuition. Overall, we find that
the extension of the ISP’s capacity choice generates results that are consistent with those
obtained from our baseline model with exogenous capacity. When the MCP’s entry is
warranted, the net neutrality can give the ISP a higher investment incentive than the non-
neutrality does. This is because the ISP is willing to invest less in a discriminatory network
in order to enhance its bargaining position to such that the MCP needs to purchase a
prioritized serve for its profitable entry. Such a strategic reason does not exist under neutral
networks. By contrast, when the ISP’s network capacity is limited and hence the entry of
the MCP becomes a binding issue, the non-neutrality gives a higher investment incentive
compared to the neutrality. This is because in a non-neutral network the ISP can internalize
more surplus generated by the MCP’s entry via bargaining with the MCP, but such a rent
extraction channel is not available in a neutral network.
6.1 The intensive margin case
Consider first the intensive margin case in which the MCP enters even without prioritization,
which is relevant only if µ ≥ µ
n
(α).31 Note that the waiting time depends on the capacity
µ not only directly but also indirectly through the MCP’s investment h∗r(µ). For concise
notation, we define w∗r(µ) ≡ wr(h∗r(µ), µ) and W ∗r (µ) ≡ Wr(h∗r(µ), µ) where h∗r(µ) denotes
the MCP’s optimal investment for a given µ in the network regime r = n, d. When the
ISP increases its capacity µ, the following two effects arise. The direct effect ∂w
∗
n(µ)
∂µ makes
the waiting time decreasing, whereas the indirect effect measured by ∂w
∗
r (µ)
∂hr
× ∂h∗r∂µ rather
31Recall that even though µ
n
depends on α, we simply write µ
n
instead of µ
n
(α).
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increases the waiting time because the investment h∗r(µ) decreases with µ. While these two
effects go in opposite direction and thus the overall effect is not determined per se, in this
subsection we assume that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect:
dw∗r(µ)
dµ
< 0,
dw∗d(µ)
dµ
< 0.
Under a non-neutral network, the ISP’s objective is given by
[v − kw∗d(µ)− c(h∗d(µ)) + βW ∗d (µ)]− [v − kw∗n(µ)− c(h∗n(µ)) + βW ∗n(µ)]
2
(29)
+ {α [v − kw∗n(µ)] + β [V −W ∗n(µ)]} − C(µ).
The first term measures a half of the surplus created by the prioritization. The braced
second term represents the default payoff that the ISP obtains without prioritization. The
first-order condition32 with respect to µ is given by
−k
[
1
2
dw∗d(µ)
dµ
−
(
1
2
− α
)
dw∗n(µ)
dµ
]
+
1
2
[
c′
dh∗n(µ)
dµ
− c′dh
∗
d(µ)
dµ
]
−β
2
[
dW ∗d (µ)
dµ
− dW
∗
n(µ)
dµ
]
= C ′(µ).
(30)
Although the LHS of (30) depends on the parameters (k, α, β), in order to pin down key
forces, let us focus on the first bracketed term and only on the direct effect of µ on waiting
time, assuming α = 0. Then, the bracketed first term is given by
∂wd(h
∗
d(µ), µ)
∂µ
− ∂wn(h
∗
n(µ), µ)
∂µ
= − a
∗
d(µ)λ(
µ− a∗d(µ)λ
)2 + a∗n(µ)λ(µ− 1− a∗n(µ)λ)2 (31)
where a∗r(µ) =
1
1+h∗r(µ)
and a∗d(µ) > a
∗
n(µ). The expression in (31) is strictly positive as long
as a∗d(µ) − a∗n(µ) is small enough, which implies that the marginal benefit of investment
is strictly negative. Therefore, in this case, the ISP has no incentive to invest in capacity
beyond µ ≥ µ
n
(α). This effect does not disappear if the investment cost function c(h) is
32A unique capacity choice requires that the LHS of the following equation, which is the marginal
benefit of the capacity expansion, is decreasing with µ. The subsequent analysis is only valid under
the set of parameters that this reasonable presumption is not violated.
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convex enough.33 The intuition behind this result is simple. A marginal capacity investment
is more effective in reducing the waiting time in the neutral network, wn, than that of the
prioritized line in the non-neutral network, wd, because the congestion problem is more
severe in the former than in the latter. Hence, the surplus created by prioritization decreases
in µ.34 A similar effect was obtained by Choi and Kim (2010).
In contrast, under a neutral network, the ISP chooses its capacity to maximize α[v −
kw∗n(µ)]+β[V −W ∗n(µ)]. Thus, the optimal capacity is determined by the following equation:
−αk
[
dw∗n(µ)
dµ
]
− β
[
dW ∗n(µ)
dµ
]
= C ′(µ), (32)
where the first bracketed term represents the waiting time change for the MCP’s content
and the second the one for the NCPs. As long as the direct effect dominates the indirect
effect, the marginal benefit from investment (i.e., RHS of (32)) is strictly positive no matter
the level of µ(≥ µ
n
) unless α = β = 0. This is quite in contrast with what happens under
non-neutral networks in which the marginal benefit from investment can be negative.
6.2 The extensive margin case
Consider now the extensive margin case in which the MCP may enter or not depending on
the ISP’s capacity choice.
We start by analyzing a benchmark in which the MCP is assumed to never enter. The
ISP’s profit obtains from the NCPs’ content only and is equal to β[V −Wn(φ, µ)] − C(µ)
where φ denotes the MCP’s absence. Hence, the optimal capacity is characterized by the
first-order condition:
−β∂Wn(φ, µ)
∂µ
= C ′(µ). (33)
The LHS of (33) measures the marginal revenue increase by extracting more surplus from
33More precisely, assume c(h) = ch
2
2 where c is a positive constant. We assume that c is large
enough relative to all other parameters including k such that the change in the MCP’s investment
is negligible.
34By contrast, if the ISP’s rent extraction is large enough such that α ≥ 1/2, the first bracketed
term in (30) will be always negative instead of being positive and hence the ISP will have an incentive
to invest in capacity.
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consumers who end up experiencing less congestion in accessing the NCPs’ content; the
RHS is the marginal cost associated with the capacity expansion. A unique solution to
(33), denoted by µφn(β), can be derived because the marginal revenue decreases with µ
while C ′(µ) increases with µ.35 We assume µφn < µr for r = n, d. This implies that
whenever the ISP induces the MCP to enter, it invests more than µφn. In this sense, the
ISP’s capacity choice is closely related to its incentive to induce the MCP’s entry. Hence,
in what follows, we analyze the ISP’s incentive to induce the entry. Let µer(≥ µr) denote
the ISP’s optimal capacity choice conditional on inducing the entry for r = n, d; in the
Appendix, we characterize µer(α, β).
Note first that regardless of the network regime, the ISP’s payoff conditional on inducing
no entry is given by
β[V −Wn(φ, µφn)]− C(µφn). (34)
Under the non-neutral network, the ISP would induce entry if and only if (34) is smaller
than
v − kw∗d(µed)− c(h∗d(µed))− β [W ∗d (µed)−Wn(φ, µed)]
2
+ β [V −Wn(φ, µed)]− C(µed). (35)
Under the neutral network, the ISP would induce entry if and only if (34) is smaller than
α [v − kw∗n(µer)] + β [V −W ∗n(µer)]− C(µer). (36)
The main difference between (35) and (36) occurs due to the difference in how much the
ISP captures from the MCP after enabling its entry, which is captured by each first term
in (35) and (36). Under the non-neutral network, the ISP can capture a half of the surplus
generated by the MCP’s entry with prioritization. In contrast, under the neutral network,
it can capture α fraction of the surplus generated without prioritization. Hence, as long as
α is small enough, the ISP is more likely to induce the MCP’s entry (and hence to invest
beyond µφn) under the non-neutral network compared to the ISP under the neutral network.
35Although µφn depends on β, we use µ
φ
n instead of µ
φ
n(β) for simplicity.
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7 Conclusion
The debate on net neutrality has been the most important and controversial regulatory
agenda since the inception of the Internet. Not surprisingly, economists have extensively
studied and helped to frame various issues, e.g., effects of network neutrality regulations on
ISPs’ investment incentives and on consumer surplus and social welfare, as well as on the
entry/exit of content providers. Yet the extant literature has not paid due attention to its
effects on other crucial innovations taking place at the edges of the Internet, although it
is imperative for scholars, regulators and policy-makers to grasp how network regulations
would affect these innovations at the edges (Maxwell and Brenner, 2012).
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that characterizes the relative size of
network capacity as a distinguishing feature to allow the entry of a congestion-sensitive
content provider, and investigate major content providers’ incentives to invest in QoS. Our
analysis sheds new light on various trade-offs that net neutrality regulations bring forth to
social welfare. The paid prioritization service can induce high-bandwidth content providers
to enter the limited capacity networks with greater QoS investments, but this comes at the
cost of increasing total traffic volume. When the entry is not constrained by the network
capacity, the prioritization relieves content providers of their burden of QoS investments
and improves efficiency by allocating the higher speed lane to more congestion-sensitive
content. However, smaller QoS investments may be detrimental to social welfare. Our
insight is consistent even when we consider the ISP’s incentive to invest in capacity.
Our paper thus can inform policy-makers of important factors that should be considered
in the formulation of net neutrality regulation as a second-best policy. For instance,
it can shed light on the FCC’s 2010 Order that treated mobile network operators more
leniently than fixed wireline network operators. Specifically, its first two rules, namely,
(i) ‘transparency’ and (ii) ‘no blocking’ were commonly applied to both types of network
operators, but the third rule (iii) ‘no unreasonable discrimination’ appertained only to fixed
line operators (47 of CFR §8.7). Maxwell and Brenner (2012) described such asymmetric
treatment of fixed and mobile networks as “by far the most controversial aspect of the
FCC’s order.” In addition, this asymmetric regulatory approach was in sharp contrast to
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the European approach that does not allow for any differential treatment of fixed and
mobile networks.36 The rationale given by the FCC for its differential treatment between
fixed and mobile networks was that its lenient non-neutral treatment may facilitate the
availability of innovative content and applications in the early-stage mobile network. Our
analysis indicates that such a policy can make sense unless the entry of new content consume
a substantial portion of the limited mobile network capacity and the surplus from new
content is outweighed by the efficiency loss from the elevated congestion for other content.
For fixed networks with large capacity, however, net neutrality regulation can be the optimal
second-best policy if the concern for weakened dynamic incentives for QoS investment with
the prioritized service looms large compared to potential static efficiency gains from better
traffic management.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is straightforward as the following inequalities establish:
Ψd(h
FB
d ) = kwd(h
FB
d ) +Wd(h
FB
d ) + c(h
FB
d ) ≤ kwd(hFBn ) +Wd(hFBn ) + c(hFBn )
< kwn(h
FB
n ) +Wn(h
FB
n ) + c(h
FB
n ) = Ψn(h
FB
n )
The first line of the above proof is by a revealed preference argument. The second inequality
is based on Property 4. 
Proof of Lemma 1
For the comparative statics, let us define an implicit functionG(hn;µ, k, λ) ≡ k(1−α)λ(µ−1)[(µ−1)(1+hn)−λ]2−
c′(hn) = 0 from (7) around the point h∗n. Then, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem
as follows:
∂hn
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
hn=h∗n
= −
∂G
∂µ (h
∗
n)
∂G
∂hn
(h∗n)
.
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One can easily determine the signs of the denominator and the numerator of ∂hn∂µ
∣∣∣
hn=h∗n
:
∂G
∂hn
(h∗n) =
−2k(1− α)λ(µ− 1)2
[(µ− 1)(1 + h∗n)− λ]3
− c′′(h∗n) < 0;
∂G
∂µ
(h∗n) =
−k(1− α)λ(µ− 1)(1 + h∗n)− kλ2
[(µ− 1)(1 + h∗n)− λ]3
< 0,
which proves Lemma 1. 
Characterization of µer(α, β)
• Under neutral networks, µen(α, β) is determined by the maximum between the solution
of (32) and µ
n
.
• Under non-neutral networks, suppose first µ ∈ [µ
d
, µ
n
). Then, the MCP enters only
with prioritization and hence the ISP chooses its capacity to maximize the following
objective:
1
2
{v − kw∗d(µ)− c(h∗d(µ)) + β [V −W ∗d (µ)]− β[V −Wn(φ, µ)]}+β [V −Wn(φ, µ)]−C(µ).
The first braced term represents the surplus created by prioritization. The second
term, β [V −Wn(φ, µ)] , is the ISP’s default payoff. The first-order condition with
respect to µ is given by
−k
2
dw∗d(µ)
dµ
− 1
2
c′(h∗d(µ))
dh∗d(µ)
dµ
− β
2
dW ∗d (µ)
dµ
− β
2
dWn(φ, µ)
dµ
= C ′(µ). (37)
Let µ̂(α, β) denote the solution to Equation (37). If µ̂(α, β) ≥ µ
n
, µed(α, β) is equal
to the solution of (30). Otherwise, µed(α, β) is determined by the one generating the
highest profit between min
{
µ̂(α, β), µ
d
}
and the solution of (30).
39
